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THE LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR: 
THE FUTURE OF LIBERIAN REFUGEES 
INTRODUCTION 
On December 24, 1989, a rebellion 
was launched against the Liberian 
government of the late Samuel Doe 
by forces of the National Patriotic 
Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by 
Charles Taylor. This insurrection 
soon ignited into one of "Africa's 
most brutal fratricidal wars" in 
which thirteen thousand to fifty 
thousand people have been esti- 
mated killed and over 1.1 million 
persons (out of an estimated na- 
tional population of 2.4 million peo- 
ple) were displaced from their homes; 
as many as seven hundred and fifty 
thousand people fled to neighbour- 
ing West African countries for ref- 
uge (Ruiz, 49, 52). Although there 
has not been an official estimate of 
the total economic and social costs of 
the war, many expect such an esti- 
mate to be gigantic in light of the 
massive destruction of economic and 
social infrastructures caused by the 
war. For instance, the hydropower 
station responsible for Monrovia's 
water supply was entirely destroyed 
and its rebuilding could take about 
five years and cost over $550 million 
(Ibid., 58). 
The Doe government was over- 
thrown in the war and with the 
imposition of a cease-fire by mem- 
bers of the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) near 
the end of 1990, fighting among the 
various warring factions has ceased. 
Consequently, national, regional and 
other international efforts are in the 
process of enablinghundreds of thou- 
sands of Liberian refugees to be re- 
patriated to their native land. Inter- 
nationally supervised elections in 
Liberia are being conducted. 
This paper presents a review of 
the war; the ECOWAS peace initia- 
tive in Liberia; relief efforts and con- 
ditions of Liberian refugees; and the 
current status of the Liberian con- 
flict. We begin with a brief historical 
background to the war. 
BACKGROUND 
The seeds of what has become pres- 
ent-day Liberia were planted in the 
early 1820s with the repatriation of 
freed black Americans to the west 
coast ofAfrica by the American Colo- 
nization Society (ACS). Before the 
arrival of the black Americans, the 
Grain Coast, now called Liberia, was 
inhabited by indigenous African peo- 
ple who made their living mostly 
from horticulture, weaving, spin- 
ning, working metal and advanced 
agricultural techniques, such as  
"shifting system of rice cultivation" 
(Dunn, 10). With the advent of the 
black American settlers, a new eco- 
nomic and political order emerged, 
in which the returnees eventually 
assumed control of the established 
Liberian state and the indigenous 
majority experienced political, eco- 
nomic and social deprivations for a 
very long time. 
Between 1847 and 1980, the gov- 
ernance of the Republic of Liberia 
was strictly monopolized by the de- 
scendants of the returned black 
Americans or 'America-Liberians,' 
as they became known. Only close to 
the end of this period were selected 
members of the indigenous popula- 
tion brought to the periphery of gov- 
ernment. In the process of consoli- 
dating their rule over the indig&zes, 
the Americo-Liberians had to fight 
not less than twenty wars against 
the different ethnic groups of Libe- 
ria, who were quite determined to 
defend their lands and cultures from 
settler occupation. However, in the 
end, the returnees succeeded in im- 
posing the so-called 'republic' on the 
indigenous majority. 
Until about 1930, there wasn't any 
substantial capital investment in 
Liberia. The economy was dominated 
by a subsistence agricultural sector 
in which the ruling elites lived on 
the exploitation of indigenous la- 
bour. 
After a brief period of internal 
political rivalry among the various 
sectors of settlers, the True Whig 
Party ClWP) ultimately emerged as 
the dominant political power-bearer 
of the Americo-Liberians. Through 
the exercise of'caste power,' the TWP 
managed successfully to subdue all 
opposition and rule Liberia uninter- 
ruptedly under a very tight one- 
party system of government for over 
a century (1878-1980). 
However, the emergence of reso- 
lute political activism in the 1970s, 
coupled with deteriorated economic 
conditions, sharply undermined the 
social base ofAmerico-Liberian rule, 
so that by the end of the decade, the 
True Whig Party had become enor- 
mously unpopular among Liberians 
who viewed the Americo-Liberians 
as the architects of their economic 
and political problems. 
Consequently, on April 12,1980, a 
group of seventeen non-commis- 
sioned men of the Liberian Armed 
Forces, led by master sergeant 
Samuel Doe, overthrew the TWP 
government of William Tolbert in a 
bloody coup, thereby ending one 
hundred and thirty three years of 
Americo-Liberian hegemony in Li- 
beria. A People's Redemption Coun- 
cil (PRC), comprising the seventeen 
coup makers, was quickly instituted 
to serve as the ruling council of the 
"Revolution." The new leader prom- 
ised popular participation and eco- 
nomic development. 
However, injust under three years, 
about half of his original councilmen 
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had been executed and some of his 
civilian cabinet ministers had fled 
into exile for their lives. By 1988, 
every social institution in Liberia 
had become repressed by the mili- 
tary government. Violations of hu- 
man rights had become a trade mark 
of the regime. All of Liberia's social 
and economic indicators had abys- 
mally degenerated. By 1989, ethnic 
tensions between the Krahns (Doe's 
tribespeople) and the Gios, had de- 
veloped into a full-blown disease 
threatening Liberia's national sta- 
bility. Thousands of Liberians were 
now refugees in foreign lands. 
As soon as it was discovered that 
the military could not provide the 
appropriate national leadership, Li- 
berians began expressing their dis- 
content and opposition to the re- 
gime. But all peaceful efforts to re- 
move the military regime from power 
failed, as the Doe government be- 
lieved in fire power and not dia- 
logue. 
THE CIVIL WAR 
The Liberian conflict began when, 
on December 24,1989, the National 
Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) 
led by Charles Taylor, entered 
Nimba county, one of Liberia's north- 
eastern regions and declared its in- 
tention to overthrow the government 
of Samuel Doe and restore constitu- 
tional democracy, economic devel- 
opment and national unity (West 
Africa, 7-13 June, 91, 3149). The 
Doe regime reacted swiftly by start- 
ing a brutal counter-insurgency op- 
eration in Nimba, "destroying vil- 
lages and exterminating members 
of rival ethnic groups" (Liberia, 2). 
These brutalities led many villagers 
to align themselves with the NPFL. 
After several months of fighting, the 
NPFL forces gained control over 
many parts of Liberia. As they gained 
greater control, the rebel forces re- 
sorted to acts of bloody retaliation 
against members of sergeant Doe's 
Krahn tribe for the atrocities they 
too had committed in Nimba. The 
conflict gradually degenerated into 
a tribalized civil war. 
As the  NPFL advanced into 
Monrovia, Liberia's Capital, govern- 
ment troops intensified their coun- 
ter-attacks and thousands of Libe- 
rian people were massacred in the 
process. It  has been estimated that 
between thirteen thousand and fifty 
thousand people were killed and 1.1 
million people (out of an estimated 
national population of 2.4 million) 
were displaced. About seven hun- 
dred and fifty thousand people fled 
to neighboring countries for refuge. 
Of this number, three hundred and 
eleven thousand people went to 
Guinea; two hundred and seventeen 
thousand to the Ivory Coast; one 
hundred and twenty-six thousand 
to Sierra Leone; six thousand to 
Ghana; and one thousand to Nigeria 
(Ruiz, 54). One of the most violent 
acts in the war was the mass mur- 
der, on July 30,1990, of six hundred 
civilian women, men and children in 
the St. Peter's Lutheran Church, a 
designated Red Cross shelter. The 
people had been in this Church for 
refuge and a group of government 
soldiers rushed into it and began a 
shooting spree. 
As the war reached its height in 
August, 1990, conditions in Liberia, 
particularly Monrovia, became de- 
plorable. People lived without food, 
water and light. Starvation and 
malnutrition were rampant, because 
international relief assistance was 
not initially forthcoming and the 
delivery of what was available was 
made difficult by the war. 
As the size of the NPFL forces 
increased, it split into two rival fac- 
tions: the National Patriotic Front 
of Liberia (NPFL) headed by Char- 
les Taylor and the Independent Na- 
tional Patriotic Front of Liberia 
(INPFL) headed by Prince Johnson. 
Although the two forces were inde- 
pendently fighting against the 
Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) com- 
manded by Samuel Doe, tensions 
between them deepened rapidly. On 
September 10, 1990, Doe was cap- 
tured by the forces of Prince Johnson 
and later killed. This did not stop 
the war. The remnants of the AFL 
fought desperately in the streets of 
Monrovia in an attempt to retain 
power. Meanwhile, the two NPFL 
factions were engaged in rival fight- 
ing, as  each tried to assume final 
control of Liberia. The country be- 
came a killing field. 
PEACE FFORTS 
The peace process in the Liberian 
conflict may be divided into two 
phases: the pre-ECOWAS phase and 
the ECOWAS phase. In the first 
phase, the Doe government initi- 
ated moves to resolve the conflict, 
with the hope that the government 
would remain in power. Within five 
months of the war, the government 
requested the intervention of the 
United States, the Liberian Council 
of Churches and the Association for 
Constitutional Democracy in Libe- 
ria (ACDL) based in the United 
States. The government's request 
failed to achieve any positive result, 
because Doe refused to accept 
ACDL's demand that he should re- 
sign and the U.S. request that he go 
into exile. On the other hand, he 
pledged his government's resolve to 
"fight to the last person" (Shettima, 
7). In June, 1990, the Liberian Coun- 
cil of Churches convened a peace 
talk between Doe and the NPFL in 
Freetown, Sierra Leone. This meet- 
ing also collapsed, because Doe re- 
fused the demand that he resign. 
Following the failure of the Free- 
town talks, it seemed that the Doe 
government was really in disarray. 
Ministers and other high officials of 
the government were abandoning 
their posts and secretly escaping 
from Liberia. Apparently in distress, 
Doe wrote a letter to the U.S. gov- 
ernment, in which he stated: 
Our capital is named after your 
president Monroe. Our flag is a 
replica of yours. Our laws were 
patterned after your laws. We in 
Liberia have always considered 
ourselves 'ktepchi1dren"ofthe U.S. 
We implore you to come and help 
your step children who are in dan- 
ger of loosing their lives and chil- 
dren. (Ibid., 9) 
Although in the early stage of the 
war, the U.S. Rangers were reported 
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to have been seen escorting Doe's 
forces in Nimba, the United States 
later refused to fully intervene in 
the war because of Liberia's increas- 
ing irrelevance to U.S. strategic in- 
terest, in light of the new changes 
taking place in global relations and 
also because of domestic public opin- 
ion against Doe. 
In the second phase of the peace 
process, members of the Economic 
Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) decided to sponsor a 
cease-fire in Liberia. In May, 1990 
at its 13th regular meetinginBanju1, 
the capital of Gambia, the ECOWAS 
set up a Standing Mediation Com- 
mittee (SMC) to deal with some of 
the political problems confronting 
the West African region. The Libe- 
rian problem occupied a forefront on 
the SMC agenda in view of its ur- 
gency and increasing regional im- 
plications. At a subsequent meeting 
in Banjul on July 5th, members of 
the SMC, including Gambia, Ghana, 
Togo, Mali and Nigeria, decided to 
send a 2,500-member peace-keep- 
ing force to Liberia. In August, the 
Community invited all the political 
parties, warring factions and inter- 
est groups in Liberia to an All-Libe- 
rian Conference in Banjul to form an 
Interim Government of National 
Unity (IGNU) to be headed by a non- 
partisan to the conflict. The man- 
date of IGNU was to provide the 
climate for national unity; facilitate 
International relief efforts; repatri- 
ate Liberian refugees; and conduct 
an internationally supervised elec- 
tion, in six months. All the parties 
invited, except Taylor's NPFL, at- 
tended the conference. Dr. Amos 
Sawyer was elected president of the 
Interim Government. And, although 
the NPFL was absent, it was offered 
six positions on the Interim Govern- 
ment, including the position of 
Speaker of the Interim National 
Assembly, which was reserved for 
Taylor. The United States and other 
countries declared their support for 
the ECOWAS initiative and pledged 
to work within its framework, even 
though the United States has not 
officially recognized the Interim Gov- 
ernment in Liberia. 
However, when the ECOWAS 
forces, known as the Economic Com- 
munity Monitoring Group (ECO- 
MOG) arrived in Monrovia in Au- 
gust, 1990 they were fiercely re- 
sisted by the NPFL of Taylor. The 
INPFL of Johnson declared its sup- 
port for the ECOWAS peace plan, 
although it later decided to with- 
draw its support from the Interim 
Government. The bombardment of 
ECOMOG's positions by Taylor's 
forces prompted the former to change 
its terms of reference from that of 
peace keeping to peace enforcement. 
The ECOMOG forces finally suc- 
ceeded in creating a buffer zone 
among the three warring factions 
(NPFL, INPFL and the remnants of 
AFL). 
Meanwhile, another dimension 
emerged in the conflict, when the 
Sierra Leone government com- 
plained tha t  NPFL forces had 
crossedinto Sierra Leone and started 
a war. Burkina Faso was also ac- 
cused by the government of aiding 
the incursion. But the rebels quickly 
responded that they were members 
of Sierra Leone's own Revolutionary 
United Front. It was through the 
intervention of Guinea and Nigeria 
that the rebel forces were defeated. 
On July 29-30, 1991 another 
ECOWAS-sponsored peace meeting 
was held in Abidjan, the Ivory Coast. 
At the end of the meeting, both in- 
terim President Sawyer and Char- 
les Taylor declared that their differ- 
ences had been overcome (Ibid., 16). 
A 5-member sub-committee of the 
SMC was commissioned to work out 
modalities for the proposed national 
elections in Liberia. The subcom- 
mittee included Liberia, Senegal, 
Guinea-Bissau, Gambia and the 
Ivory Coast. Former U.S. President 
Jimmy Carter's International Ne- 
gotiation Network (INN) was con- 
tacted to serve as part of the Libe- 
rian election process. 
RELIEF EFFORTS AND 
REFUGEES 
There were about seven hundred 
and fifty thousand Liberians who 
fled the war and over seventy-seven 
thousand were displaced. According 
to some international relief work- 
ers, international response to the 
Liberian plight was "too little, too 
late" (Liberia, 15). Emergency food 
supplies did not arrive in Liberia 
until September, 1990, nine months 
after the eruption of the war. The 
U.N. failed to designate a special 
representative to Liberia to facili- 
tate relief efforts (Ibid., 18). 
Although the U.S. government led 
the relief efforts in Liberia, it has 
been criticized for not having done 
enough, given the longstanding his- 
torical relationship between Liberia 
and the United States. Also, many 
countries consider Liberia as a U.S. 
problem, referring to the huge 
amount of military and economic 
aid donated to the Doe dictatorship. 
By mid-December, 1990, total U.S. 
relief assistance stood at $72.6 mil- 
lion, including in-kind assistance 
and embassy contributions (Ibid., 
21). It now stands at  $140 million 
(WestAfrica, 11-17Nov. 1991,1887). 
In addition to the United States, 
several international relief agencies 
and voluntary relief groups were 
working in Liberia. These included 
the UNDP, UNICEF, the World Food 
Program (WFP), United Nations De- 
velopment Relief Organization 
(UNDRO), Catholic Relief Services 
(CRS) and others (Ibid., 21-22). 
There were also a number of Libe- 
rianvoluntary organizations, includ- 
ing the Special Emergency Life Food 
(SELF); the Liberian Committee for 
Relief, Resettlement and Recon- 
struction (LICORE); the Christian 
Health Association of Liberia 
(CHAL) and others. 
In the neighboring countries, 
where Liberian refugees fled, a 
number of problems, such as bad 
roads and lack of trucks, made relief 
efforts difficult. One unique feature 
of the Liberian situation was the 
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non-existence of refugee camps in 
the host countries. Before interna- 
tional relief assistance arrived, al- 
most all of the refugees were ac- 
cepted into the private homes of the 
host nationals. This eventually 
caused a strain on the resources of 
the local populations. However, 
when relief assistance later arrived, 
it was intended only for the refu- 
gees. The situation caused some re- 
sentment among many villagers who 
now needed assistance, too. A spe- 
cial appeal to the international com- 
munity by UNDRO's officials for as- 
sistance to compensate the affected 
populations in Guinea met with a 
"very disappointing" response (Ibid., 
23). 
THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE 
CONFLICT 
Although there are good reasons for 
optimism, there are also grounds for 
caution towards the current peace 
process and the future of Liberia 
and its citizens. The optimism stems 
from the result of the latest round of 
peace talks held in Yamoussoukro, 
the Ivory Coast, at  the end of Octo- 
ber, 1991. According to the final com- 
munique released on October 30th, 
Charles Taylor has agreed to disarm 
his forces under the supervision of 
ECOMOG within 60 days. Follow- 
ing the process of disarmament by 
all parties, repatriation and reha- 
bilitation of Liberian refugees will 
proceed. This will then provide the 
groundwork for elections to be con- 
ducted in April 1992 (West Africa, 
11-17 Nov. 1991, 1886). Before the 
election, ECOMOG is expected to 
occupy all of Liberia's air and sea 
ports and create buffer zones to sepa- 
rate the warring factions. This would 
allow Liberians to return home and 
safely participate in the election. 
For such a task, ECOMOG is plan- 
ning to augment its forces to ten 
thousand with the addition of troops 
from Senegal. I t  should be noted, 
however, that up to publication time, 
Taylor has not yet complied with the 
terms of Yamoussoukro W, he has 
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not disarmed his forces and there 
are fears that this may jeopardize 
the election plan. 
All those who attended the talks, 
including former U.S. President 
Jimmy Carter, expressed their sat- 
isfaction with the results. However, 
there are reports about possible "ob- 
stac1es"to the plan from theyamous- 
soukro talks (Ibid.). The United Lib- 
eration Movement for Democracy 
(ULIMO), comprising remnants of 
Doe's forces and supported by the 
Movement for the Redemption of 
Liberian Moslems (MRM), is said to 
be displeased with ECOWAS' con- 
cessions to Taylor and insists that 
the NPFL should disarm uncondi- 
tionally. ULIMO's forces claimed to 
be 60miles inside Liberia and vow to 
continue their "strictly military" 
campaign against Taylor's forces 
(Ibid .). 
Meanwhile, efforts are being taken 
on the ground to actualize the 
Yamoussoukro plan. Prince John- 
son, who had withdrawn his support 
for the Interim government, is now 
said to be coming back to ECOWAS. 
The ad hoc Supreme Court, estab- 
lished to moderate the election, is 
nowgettingfundingfromU.S.-based 
organizations such as the National 
Democratic and National Republic 
Institutes (Ibid., 1887). 
While the current state of affairs 
in the Liberian conflict deserves both 
optimism and caution, there are rea- 
sons for more optimism. Firstly, the 
presence of Doe's supporters in the 
ULIMO has rendered that move- 
ment virtually without a base, in 
terms of both national and interna- 
tional support. Secondly, the 
ECOWAS peace process has strong 
domestic and international legiti- 
macy and it will be difficult for a 
discredited force such as ULIMO to 
destroy it. I think the ball is in 
ECOWAS' court and also Taylor's. If 
Taylor t ruly cooperates with 
ECOWAS, I believe that the long- 
sought objective of peace in Liberia 
finally will be achieved in the fore- 
seeable future. And Liberian refu- 
gees will then be safe and happy to 
return to their Liberian villages. 
Note 
*Moses Geepu-Nah Tiepoh is a re- 
searcher at  the Centre for Refugee 
Studies, York University. 
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